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Giannakis: Faking Equity

FAKING EQUITY: A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW YORK
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION STATUTE AS APPLIED TO
LICENSES AND DEGREES UNDER THE O’BRIEN DECISION
Nicole Giannakis
I.

INTRODUCTION

The landmark decision of O’Brien v. O’Brien1 attempted to
reform New York State’s interpretation of divorce laws and its underlying policy.2 This decision determined that a spouse’s professional
license could constitute marital property if it is obtained during the
marriage and, if so, would be subject to equitable distribution.3 New
York enacted equitable distribution in order to remedy some of the
inequalities that existed under former divorce laws.4 This Comment
seeks to address two issues that have resulted from the O’Brien decision being decided in the context of the Equitable Distribution Statute, which include (1) the difficulty of placing a value on a license
and degree and (2) the resistance of trial courts to granting adequate
awards based on the appraised values of licenses and degrees, despite
the intent of the statute; both of which have resulted in the statute being inequitable. This Comment proposes that there is a need for the
legislature to create more uniform rules of valuing and granting


J.D. Candidate, 2014, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. 2010, Marist College, B.A. in Political Science and Certificate in Paralegal. I wish to thank my supportive
family and friends for their encouragement and understanding in all my endeavors. Furthermore, I would like to recognize Mr. Thomas Rottenberger who was integral to this
Comment’s publication. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Desiree Kennedy who
voluntarily agreed to advise me throughout the writing of this Comment. Lastly, I would
like to thank Jonathan Vecchi and the rest of the Touro Law Review who made this publication possible.
1
489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
2
Ira Mark Ellman, O’Brien v. O’Brien: A Failed Reform, Unlikely Reformers, 27 PACE L.
REV. 949, 949 (2007).
3
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 713.
4
David Kaufman, The New York Equitable Distribution Statute: An Update, 53 BROOK.
L. REV. 845, 845 (1987).
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awards based on attained licenses and degrees.
Prior to the Equitable Distribution Statute, the title theory approach was used to distribute property upon divorce.5 The Equitable
Distribution Statute views marriage as an economic partnership and
distributes property accordingly,6 in an attempt to remedy the unfairness.7 Although O’Brien sought to minimize the inequality of previous divorce methods,8 it also created problems in its application due
to the inability to place a proper valuation on the future return of an
attained license or degree.9 Part II of this Comment provides a general history of divorce law and the enactment of the Equitable Distribution Statute in New York; Part III discusses the precedent established by O’Brien and its expansion; Part IV discusses the
circumstances in which a license or degree may be subject to equitable distribution and the reasons why they fail in practice; Part V discusses the various methods of valuating degrees and licenses, and the
imprecise task of obtaining an accurate valuation; Part VI emphasizes
the use of judicial discretion in granting these rewards, as well as
provides some empirical evidence to prove the effects of such discretion; Part VII discusses the problems of a license or degree that is
subject to a distributive award when it is not subject to modification;
Part VIII explores how other states classify license and degrees and
their approach to distributing awards; Part IX makes a proposal for
5
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 716; see also Ellman, supra note 2, at 950 (explaining the title
theory as a method used by most states prior to the 1960’s, which focused on the name in
which the property’s title was held in determining allocation of property in divorce actions).
6
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 717; see Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity
in ‘Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse’ Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 756 (1988) (“In equitable distribution jurisdictions, the question is no longer who owns the propergty [sic], but
rather, what stake or right each spouse has in the property. Marriage is seen as a ‘joint enterprise’ or ‘economic partnership’ and courts are free to distribute the parties’ accumulated
assets as the equities of each case require, not solely according to who holds legal title.”).
7
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 716.
8
See Ellman, supra note 2, at 950 (stating that title theory awards created a large disparity
of property distribution between husband and wife because most title to property was held in
the husband’s name; alimony awards were discretionary, resulting in unfair awards and failing to provide “a satisfactory substitute for property share”); see also Marsha Garrison, Good
Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce
Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 624 (1991) (suggesting that alimony was infrequently
awarded and often went unpaid and if alimony was awarded it was “in inadequate amounts,
and for inadequate periods of time”).
9
Ellman, supra note 2, at 981 (“O’Brien has made it impossible for New York to follow
the national trend toward divorce law that presumes marital property be divided equally.
The division of marital property in New York must instead involve time-consuming and expensive inquiries into the conduct of the parties’ marriage.”).
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change in the current New York treatment of licenses and degrees.
II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PROPERTY DIVISION IN
DIVORCE ACTIONS

Before the 1960’s, the “most important factor in allocating
property” upon divorce was title.10 Upon the dissolution of marriage,
any earnings and property held in a single spouse’s name was the
named spouse’s as a matter of law.11 This usually resulted in disparate awards between men and women because men usually held title
in most property.12
In an effort to reduce these disparities the English concept of
alimony13 was introduced, which required the husband to pay installments on a weekly or monthly basis to his former wife.14 Alimony became subject to criticism because it was infrequently awarded
and, if bestowed, was difficult to collect.15 In addition, some “feminists and women’s advocates” sought to reform alimony because it
“perpetuated traditional notions of women as dependents and failed
to recognize the value of a wife’s contributions as a homemaker and
parent.”16 They also argued that alimony seemed outdated based on
the increasing amount of women in the workforce.17 Most importantly, alimony did not address the underlying issue of property distribution meaning that although the wife received some type of relief,
there was still no resolution to the inequity of property distribution
upon divorce.18

10

Id. at 950.
Id.
12
Id.
13
See Garrison, supra note 8, at 626 (explaining that the concept of alimony “derives
from the practices of English ecclesiastical courts,” and was awarded to the wife based predominantly on unjust enrichment); see also id. (stating that it was believed that alimony
should only be granted if the husband was at fault for the dissolution as a means of “requiring him to fulfill his marital support obligation”).
14
Ellman, supra note 2, at 950.
15
Garrison, supra note 8, at 624.
16
Id. at 630.
17
Id.; see also Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview
of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2023 (2000) (noting that the Civil War perpetuated the movement of
women into the workforce as women were needed as teachers and nurses).
18
Ellman, supra note 2, at 950.
11
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The Emergence of Equitable Property Distribution
and its Rationale

During the mid-1960s there was a sharp increase in divorce
rates, which came with a need to reform divorce laws.19 As a result,
some states began to incorporate “equitable remedies to soften the
English rules.”20 Furthermore, reforms in allocation of property
claims were a more appropriate solution to remedying these, as opposed to reforms to current alimony laws, because they were more reliable based on their finality.21 Allocation was also easier to enforce
because it permitted the spouse to attach and seize other property to
satisfy his or her judgment.22
Reformers turned to the “ready model” of community property in establishing the concept of equitable distribution.23 Community
property is a concept that treats all property earned during the marriage as joint property, regardless of whom holds title to the property.24 Most states, including New York, did not accept this strict model of “equal property division” because a more flexible approach that
allowed for individual treatment of cases was preferred.25 New York
instead focused on “equitable property distribution” and began to determine what constitutes marital property and how it should be valued
and allocated between parties.26
B.

New York’s Enactment of Equitable Distribution
Law and the General Laws Regarding Property in
Divorce Actions

In July of 1980, the New York legislature enacted the Equita19

Id. at 951; see also W. Bradford Wilcox, The Evolution of Divorce, 1 NAT’L AFFAIRS
81, 82 (2009) (attributing the rise of the divorce rate to the “introduction of no-fault divorce,” “[t]he sexual revolution,” the feminist movement, “the anti-institutional tenor,” and,
“the psychological revolution . . . which was itself fueled by a post-war prosperity”).
20
Ellman, supra note 2, at 951; see also Garrison, supra note 8, at 630 (“Alimony thus
was nowhere abolished, although many states enacted new standards that emphasized the use
of alimony for transitional, ‘rehabilitative’ purposes to limit its use and duration.”).
21
Ellman, supra note 2, at 951.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.; see also Garrison, supra note 8, at 628 (stating that the difference between community property and equitable distribution is that “equitable property distribution applied only
at divorce; in an intact marriage, legal title prevailed”).
25
Garrison, supra note 8, at 631.
26
Id.
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ble Distribution Statute in an attempt to ensure a fair distribution of
marital property upon dissolution of the marriage, which is premised
on an economic partnership theory.27 The statute was meant to consider both parties’ “contributions . . . [to the marriage] as . . .
spouse[s,] . . . wage earner[s] and homemaker[s].”28 Thus, it takes
into account “both direct and indirect contributions” of each spouse.29
The Equitable Distribution Statute shifts from the concept of granting
assets due to necessity, to a theory based on equity and fairness because the “assets represent the capital product of what was essentially
an economic partnership.”30
New York’s Domestic Relations Law (DRL) categorizes
property into two groups to determine distribution upon divorce: separate property and marital property.31 The statute’s definition of separate property is an express and infinite listing, which includes property that was acquired before marriage, property that was acquired by
descent or gift from a third party, compensation from personal injury
claims, “property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of
separate property” unless the appreciation was due to contributions of
the spouse, and property that has been established as separate by written agreement.32 In contrast, marital property is defined as “property
acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the
execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held.”33 Under this statute, marital property is notably broad, while separate
property is restrictive to the explicit listing.34 Thus, the broad definition of marital property in the statute comes with the problematic ex-

27

Kaufman, supra note 4, at 846; see also Kenneth R. Davis, The Doctrine of O’Brien v.
O’Brien: A Critical Analysis, 13 PACE L. REV 863, 879 (1994) (“The court based its analysis
on the policy of the Equitable Distribution Law, which recognizes that a marriage is an economic partnership and that non-financial contributions are as significant as financial ones.”).
28
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 715.
29
Id. at 718.
30
Id. at 717 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
31
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 852.
32
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(d)(1)-(4) (McKinney 2010).
33
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(b)(1)(c); see also O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 715 (defining
marital property as “all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and
before the…commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which the title
is held”).
34
Price v. Price, 503 N.E.2d 684, 685 (N.Y. 1986); see also Raviv v. Raviv, 545 N.Y.S.2d
739, 740 (App. Div. 1989) (stating that there is a presumption in favor of finding for marital
property and the burden is on the defendant to overcome that presumption).
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pense of giving “judges too much discretion” under the equitable distribution doctrine, which has created “unpredictable and sometimes
arbitrary results.”35
Furthermore, the statute explicitly states its application to distribution, maintenance, spousal agreements, and other matters.36
Maintenance awards are either written agreements or court orders
where one spouse must pay sums in fixed intervals to the other, for a
definite or indefinite period of time.37 The concept of maintenance
was introduced to provide the spouse with an opportunity to achieve
economic independence, as opposed to relying on lifetime dependence and support from the former spouse.38 The award terminates
upon death of either party or upon the recipient spouse’s remarriage.39 The resulting impact of maintenance awards have been controversial because under this model of distribution, there is an increased risk that the contributing spouse will never receive adequate
consideration for his or her contributions.40
The statute also describes a distributive award, which is a
written agreement between the parties or a court order that provides
for payments by one spouse to another “in lieu of or to supplement,
facilitate or effectuate the division . . . of property,” to be paid in one
lump sum or throughout a period of time.41 A distributive award is
often used in situations where the division of the marital property is
impracticable or illegal, and therefore a monetary award is more appropriate than the actual distribution of property. 42 A distributive
award allows for the concept of equity, wherein one spouse is compensated for their contributions, as opposed to a grant of awards to
facilitate economic dependence.43 A major distinction between a distributive award and a maintenance decree is that under Domestic Relations Law (DMR) § 236(B)(9)(b) a decree of maintenance may be
35
Garrison, supra note 8, at 632; see also id. at 730 (emphasizing the troubling fact that
“the wife’s average share of net marital property tends to decline as the couple’s net worth
increases”).
36
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 849.
37
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (B)(1)(a).
38
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 853; see also Garrison, supra note 8, at 640 (stating the objective of the maintenance award “suggests that courts should . . . award maintenance for
short-term, ‘rehabilitative’ purposes”).
39
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 854.
40
Garrison, supra note 8, at 640.
41
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (B)(b).
42
Litman v. Litman, 463 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (App. Div. 1983).
43
Id.
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modified, whereas under DMR § 236(B)(5)(e) a distributive award
“once made, is not subject to change.”44 This has become a particularly important distinction in New York based on current precedent
classifying licenses and degrees as marital property, subjecting them
to equitable distribution granted by distributive awards.45
The Equitable Distribution Statute was passed in an effort to
promote fairness and equity, but in the years following its enactment,
the courts did not rule in a manner that would effectuate its goals.46
There was a period in which New York State Courts blatantly disregarded the statute and did not properly account for all the marital assets.47 This is demonstrated in Conner v. Conner,48 in which the trial
court held that “an academic degree was not subject to evaluation as
marital property.”49 The court acknowledged that both partners made
contributions to the marriage with an expectation that they would be
entitled to the benefits.50 However, the court emphasized that both
partners knew of the possibility of dissolution, and therefore ruled
that it was not relevant to add the spouse’s future potential earnings
in the disbursement of property.51
III.

THE LANDMARK DECISION OF O’BRIEN V. O’BRIEN

In 1985, the landmark decision of O’Brien established a firm
precedent proclaiming that it depicted the true meaning and intent of
the statute, with regards to valuation, distribution and classification of
marital property.52 In O’Brien, the parties were married in April of
1971, and at that time, both were employed as teachers. 53 The husband returned to school to complete premedical courses in order to
apply to medical school.54 In 1973, the parties moved to Guadalajara,

44

O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720.
Id. at 716.
46
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 863.
47
Id. at 847.
48
468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 482 (App. Div. 1983).
49
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 867.
50
Id. at 865.
51
Id. at 867.
52
Id. at 846 (stating that the equitable distribution doctrine is based on the premise that
marriage is an economic partnership and, therefore, the legislature attempted to ensure that
there would be a fair distribution of marital property upon the dissolution of marriage).
53
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 713.
54
Id. at 714.
45
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Mexico and the husband became a full time medical student.55 During the course of his studies, both parties contributed to “living and
educational expenses.”56 However, it is uncontested that the wife
“contributed all of her earnings to their living and education expenses
and that her financial contributions exceeded those of plaintiff.”57
The parties returned to New York, and in October of 1980, the husband, plaintiff, was licensed to practice medicine.58 He commenced
the divorce action two months later.59 At the commencement of divorce, the parties’ only valuable asset was the husband’s newly acquired medical license, and the central issue was whether this asset
was marital property, subject to equitable distribution.60
Plaintiff argued that professional licenses were not marital
property because they do not satisfy the traditional definition of property.61 The New York Court of Appeals responded to this argument
by stating that ultimately, a professional license is property that has
value, which can be calculated by the money lost while it was acquired, as well as the enhanced earning capacity granted to the holder.62 Furthermore, the court went on to say that marital property is
not governed by traditional property concepts because it is a unique
statutory creation and should be construed according to the language
provided in the statute.63
The court created New York precedent stating that a license is
in fact marital property under the meaning of DRL § 236 and is subject to equitable distribution.64 Thus, the statute was interpreted to
55

Id.
Id.
57
Id.
58
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 714.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 713.
61
Id. at 717; see also Conner v. Conner, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 493 (App. Div. 1983) (Titone,
J., concurring) (“As the term is commonly understood, a professional license or degree possesses none of the attributes of ‘property.’ It has no monetary value on the open market and
cannot be transferred, assigned, sold, pledged or inherited.”).
62
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 717.
63
Davis, supra note 27, at 869; see also Kaufman, supra note 4, at 869 (stating “[m]arital
property is simply a way of defining those items of value to which spouses may have an equitable claim on the basis of both the remedial statute and the marital relationship. There is
no common law property interest remotely resembling marital property.”).
64
Davis, supra note 27, at 863; see also O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 580-81 (holding that
“plaintiff's medical license constitutes ‘marital property’ within the meaning of Domestic
Relations Law § 236(B)(1)(c) and that it is therefore subject to equitable distribution pursuant to subdivision 5 of that part”).
56
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mean that “an interest in a profession or a professional career potential is marital property which may be represented by direct or indirect
contributions of the non-title holding spouse, including financial contributions and nonfinancial contributions made by caring for the
home and family.”65 The court explained that because the license
was attained through joint efforts it is marital property.66 The court
sought to compensate Mrs. O’Brien based on the sympathetic circumstances of the case, but unfortunately “[w]hat started with a poorly reasoned decision in O’Brien has spawned a line of cases which
have left the lower courts adrift in a sea of illogic.”67
A.

Expanding O’Brien

Following the O’Brien decision, a New York State Supreme
Court was confronted with the issue of whether the precedent of
treating licenses as marital property applied only to licenses or
whether it could be extended and applied to other types of educational advances such as Master’s degrees.68 In McGowan v. McGowan,69
the defendant husband argued that his wife’s Master’s degree for
teaching should be considered marital property.70 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department recognized a
distinction between professional licenses and academic degrees because a degree did not necessarily grant the legal right to participate
in a particular profession; it simply allowed the recipient to acquire
more knowledge about a specific discipline.71 However, the court referred to O’Brien for guidance and recognized that the significant aspect of that case was not whether the holder was in a particular practice, but rather whether the holder had enhanced his or her future
earning capacity.72
The court concluded that there was no reason to form a dis-

65

Davis, supra note 27, at 872.
Id. at 870.
67
Peter Bronstein and David Typermass, From O’Brien to Keane: Building on a Weak
Foundation, 41 N.Y.S.B.A. FAMILY L. REV. 3, 3 (2009).
68
Davis, supra note 27, at 874.
69
535 N.Y.S.2d 990 (App. Div. 1988).
70
Id. at 992.
71
Id. at 993; see also Judge v. Judge, 851 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (App. Div. 2008) (“An academic degree may constitute a marital asset subject to equitable distribution, even though the
degree may not necessarily confer the legal right to engage in a particular profession.”).
72
McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
66
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tinction between degrees and professional licenses when categorizing
separate and marital property, and therefore a Master’s degree should
be considered marital property.73 The court in McGowan clearly held
true to the principal of equitable distribution and concluded that the
non-titled spouse would receive a just portion of the assets, regardless
of whether the enhanced earnings were a result of a license or a degree.74
IV.

ESTABLISHING THAT THE LICENSE OR DEGREE SHOULD BE
SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

There are three required elements for a distributive award to
be made to a spouse, which include (1) an enhanced earning capacity
attributable to the license or degree; (2) the non-titled spouse contributed to the license or degree attainment; and (3) the license or degree
has value.75 Therefore, even though licenses and degrees are to be
classified as marital property because they result in an enhanced earning capacity, it does not automatically subject them to equitable distribution.76 The accrual of the marital property77 and the non-titled
spouse’s contributions to its attainment are both relevant factors in
determining whether the license or degree will be subject to equitable
distribution.78
A.

Accrual of Marital Property

The court uses timing as a point of reference in order to determine whether a license or degree will be subject to equitable distribution in a divorce proceeding.79 There are three scenarios that of73

Id. at 994; see also Judge, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 640 (holding that the wife’s MBA degree
enhanced her earning capacity and was subject to equitable distribution); see also Jayaram v.
Jayaram, 880 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 (holding that the husband’s MBA degree although “not an
actual prerequisite to his employment at the brokerage firm” it nonetheless increased his
earning capacity and constituted marital property).
74
McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
75
Philip Sherwood Greenhaus, Equitable Distribution of a Never Used Professional License, 66 N.Y. ST. B. J. 20, 23 (1994).
76
Id.
77
McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 994-95.
78
Evans v. Evans, 866 N.Y.S.2d 788, 790 (App. Div. 2008).
79
McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 995; see also Spence v. Spence, 731 N.Y.S.2d 66, 66 (App.
Div. 2001) (holding “[t]he husband’s enhanced earning capacity as an investment banker
[was] not marital property subject to equitable distribution” because he “earned his MBA,
Series 7 license, and Series 63 license four years before the marriage”).
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ten arise with regards to timing disputes.80 First, when the requirements for a degree or license were completed before the marriage, but
the physical award or certificate was not obtained until after the marriage.81 Second, when most courses were completed during the marriage, but not all.82 Finally, when a degree is obtained before a marriage, but additional work is required and completed during the
marriage to allow one to properly enter the field.83
In McGowan, the first circumstance presented itself. The issue in the case was whether a certain teaching certificate, awarded
two weeks after the marriage, would be considered marital property.84
Plaintiff argued that her education to obtain the certificate was completed before the marriage to the defendant, and therefore should not
constitute marital property.85 Defendant countered by reiterating the
holding in O’Brien, which stated that licenses acquired during the
marriage, constitute marital property.86 The court in McGowan made
it evident that defendant’s argument was a far too simplistic interpretation and that the policy behind O’Brien’s ruling was to remedy a
social injustice by providing compensation for a spouse, who to her
detriment, supported the other spouse through an educational program and then was refused the benefits as a result of divorce.87 The
court held that the “license or degree will constitute marital property
only to the extent that it is attributable to the work during the marriage.”88 Therefore, the court held that plaintiff’s teaching certificate
was not marital property because her increased skill, knowledge, and
increased earning capacity were earned prior to the marriage.89
In the case of Kyle v. Kyle,90 the second timing issue presented itself, which is when all courses have not been completed in order
80

McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
Id. at 994.
82
Kyle v. Kyle, 548 N.Y.S.2d 781, 783 (App. Div. 1990).
83
Shoenfeld v. Shoenfeld, 563 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502 (App. Div. 1990).
84
McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
85
Id. at 992.
86
Id. at 994.
87
Id. at 995.
88
Id.; see also Allocco v. Allocco, 578 N.Y.2d 995, 999 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (holding that “the
successful completion of the civil service examinations, which resulted from the knowledge
represented by these degrees as well as the direct studies for such examinations, enhanced
the Defendant’s earning capacity, and should be considered as marital property subject to
equitable distribution”).
89
McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
90
Kyle, 548 N.Y.S.2d 781.
81
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to obtain a license.91 In this case, at the time the divorce was commenced, the husband still needed two courses to obtain his principal’s
license.92 The New York Appellate Division, Second Department
ruled that the license was not marital property because it was not acquired during the marriage, reasoning that mere anticipation of a license in the future does not qualify for equitable distribution.93
In Shoenfeld v. Shoenfeld,94 a third timing issue arose in
which the parties married after the spouse had obtained his medical
degree, but still required a one year program in order to obtain his license in New York.95 During this one-year program, his wife was the
sole income provider.96 The New York Appellate Division, Second
Department held that under these circumstances, the non-licensed
spouse was entitled to an interest in the medical license.97
The issue of timing is one that may conflict with the ultimate
purpose of equitable distribution, which is to ensure that there is a
fair distribution of marital property upon dissolution of marriage, and
therefore it takes into consideration the contributions that both parties
have made, whether direct or indirect.98 In circumstances where a
court considers the timing that the license or degree was received the
result can sometimes lead to inequity, as seen in Kyle.99
The intended purposes of the statute are undermined if a license or degree is automatically exempted from marital assets based
on technicalities and despite the substantial contributions put forth by
the non-titled spouse.100 If trial courts were properly carrying out the
intentions of the statute the substantial contributions of the non-titled
spouse would require an award to promote equity and fairness.101

91

Id. at 783.
Id.
93
Id.; see also Berkman v. Berkman, 563 N.Y.S.2d 990, 992 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (explaining
that mere academic credits accumulated during a marriage did not yield an enhanced earning
capacity and therefore were not subject to equitable distribution).
94
Shoenfeld, 563 N.Y.S.2d 500.
95
Id. at 502.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 503.
98
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 846.
99
Kyle, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
100
See O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 715 (stating the intention of the Equitable Distribution
Statute is to consider both parties contributions to the marriage as spouses, wage earners, and
homemakers).
101
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 846.
92
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Contributions of the Non-Titled Spouse

Although the time of the accrual of the property is relevant in
the court’s analysis to determine whether the property is marital and
subject to equitable distribution, there is a greater focus on the contributions that the non-titled spouse has made in its attainment.102 Accrual of the license or degree can sometimes be helpful in proving
that the non-titled spouse did not make substantial contributions to its
attainment.103 The non-titled spouse seeking the award has the burden of showing that he or she made a substantial contribution in the
attainment of the degree or license in order to obtain a portion of the
enhanced earning potential.104 In one case, the Appellate Division
stated:
Where only modest contributions are made by the
nontitled spouse toward the other spouse’s attainment
of a degree or professional license, and the attainment
is more directly the result of the titled spouse’s own
ability, tenacity, perseverance and hard work, it is appropriate for courts to limit the distributed amount of
that enhanced earning capacity.105
In Farrell v. Cleary-Farrell,106 the husband was entitled to a
distributive award of only seven and a half percent of his wife’s dental hygienist license.107 The New York Appellate Division reasoned
that the wife “exerted extraordinary efforts to complete her degree
and obtain her license.”108 The wife worked while at school, took
care of the children, was responsible for the household chores and
even gave birth mid-semester but still completed her classes.109
While the wife attended school, the husband remained as the main
source of income for the family, assisted with the children, maintained the outside yard work and supported his wife throughout her

102

McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
Id.
104
Esposito-Shea v. Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796 (App. Div. 2012); see also O’Brien,
489 N.E.2d at 715; see also Brough v. Brough, 727 N.Y.S.2d 555, 558 (App. Div. 2001).
105
Evans, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (citations omitted).
106
761 N.Y.S.2d 357 (App. Div. 2003).
107
Id. at 359.
108
Id. at 360.
109
Id.
103
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schooling.110 Despite this, the husband’s contributions were not
deemed substantial because during this time it was shown that he advanced his own career because he worked long hours and engaged in
business related travel.111
Similar to the approach of marital property, the non-titled
spouse can obtain the appreciated value of separate property if they
can prove that they made substantial contributions, which result in
the appreciated value.112 In Price v. Price,113 the husband owned an
interest in a family appliance business.114 The husband acquired this
interest as a gift prior to the marriage, which DRL § 236(B)(1)(d)
classifies as separate property.115 The business thrived and upon divorce the wife sought to obtain a part of the business’ appreciated
value, she claimed her indirect contributions as a homemaker and
mother contributed to the increased value of the business.116 The issue became whether the appreciated value of the business could be
constituted as marital property, because the wife’s indirect contributions helped facilitate the increased value of the separate property.117
The New York Court of Appeals held that the Equitable Distribution
Law allowed for the increased value of one spouse’s separate property to be considered marital property, if the increased value was a result “in part to the indirect contributions or efforts” of the other
spouse.118 In this decision, the court looked beyond the statutory language and factored in the policy considerations, which:
reflect[] an awareness that the economic success of the
partnership depends not only upon the respective fi110

Id.
Farrell, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 360 (noting that “[w]hile defendant attended school and received her license as a dental hygienist, plaintiff was busy advancing his own career, gaining
promotions and doubling his salary during the marriage. Under all of these circumstances,
Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiff a modest portion of defendant's enhanced earning capacity.”).
112
Davis, supra note 27, at 879; see also Hartog v. Hartog, 647 N.E.2d 749, 754 (N.Y.
1995) (stating that the non-titled spouse need only show that the titled spouse actively participated to some degree in the appreciation to an asset to classify the appreciation of that asset
as a marital asset).
113
503 N.E.2d 684, 686 (N.Y. 1986).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 685-86.
116
Id. at 689.
117
Id. at 685.
118
Price, 503 N.E.2d at 685; see also Majuskas v. Majuskas, 463 N.E.2d 17, 19 (N.Y.
1984) (holding that increased value in pension rights is marital property because it is the
product of continued employment during the marriage).
111
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nancial contributions of the partners, but also on a
wide range of nonremunerated services to the joint enterprise, such as homemaking, raising children and
providing the emotional and moral support necessary
to sustain the other spouse in coping with the vicissitudes of life outside the home.119
Therefore, if the non-titled spouse made substantial contributions to
the enhanced earnings or appreciated values, they should be compensated and be granted an award that adequately reflects their contributions.120
The New York Court of Appeals held that licenses and degrees are marital property subject to equitable distribution because it
sought to remedy a social injustice “that results when one spouse, to
the detriment of his or her own fulfillment, labors in order to support
the other spouse through an educational program, only to be divorced
before the economic rewards of that program are realized.”121 The
rationale behind this approach is that when a spouse agrees to take on
an educational venture by the other, he or she makes financial sacrifices with an expectation that they will both eventually enjoy the
benefits of that degree or license.122 Furthermore, the spouse often
chooses to make a financial sacrifice and postpone living a certain
lifestyle with the expectation of having an even greater reward due to
these sacrifices.123
However, as seen in the above analysis, a license or degree
could be considered for equitable distribution only when the nontitled spouse made substantial contributions to its attainment, which
reveals that this law is in effect reimbursement to the non-titled
spouse.124 Contrary to the intent of the statute, trial courts’ decisions
are not treating the couple as equals in an economic partnership that
accounts for all their contributions, including both monetary and
household.125 “Post-divorce income surveys have uniformly shown
119

Price, 503 N.E.2d at 687 (internal quotations omitted).
Davis, supra note 27, at 879.
121
McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
122
Davis, supra note 27, at 890.
123
Id.
124
Ann Weiss, Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law: A Proposal for Excluding Educational Degrees and Professional Licenses from the Marital Estate, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1327, 1351 (1983).
125
Id.; see also Garrison, supra note 8, at 726 (stating that “divorce law should protect the
justifiable expectations of marriage partners that are based on marital commitment and day120
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that women’s per capita income and standard of living tend to decline
substantially following divorce, while those of men tend to increase.”126 This disparity is mainly attributed to the fact that under
the Equitable Distribution Statute “women’s contributions as homemakers are typically undervalued.”127 Five years after the statute was
enacted a study revealed that the average marital property award to
the wife was thirty percent.128 Furthermore, a study done by Legal
Awareness for Women, Inc. (LAW) discovered that out of twentyseven divorced women, seventy-four percent were with husbands
who were in a professional practice or entrepreneurial venture and
only two received distributive awards.129 These results led to the
conclusion that there are “apparent inequities resulting from the division of intangible property”130 which can be attributed to either “the
interpretation of the statute or [to] the language of the statute itself.”131
V.

VALUATION OF A LICENSE OR DEGREE

Once it is established that a professional license or degree is
in fact marital property that should be subject to equitable distribution
based on the case specific circumstances, the court then faces the
problem of how to place a value on it.132 Although, Equitable Distribution Law does not require an equal division of marital property, it
requires a process that promotes fairness.133 In order to properly carry out the intent of the statute, the value of the enhanced earnings resulting from the attainment of the license or degree should not be
overestimated or underestimated.134 However, it should account for
appreciation in value135 and should account for the entirety of the
length in time that the license or degree will produce enhanced earn-

to-day sharing.”).
126
Garrison, supra note 8, at 633.
127
Id. at 632.
128
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 863.
129
Id. at 864.
130
Id. at 863-64.
131
Id. at 864.
132
Scott Willoughby, Professional Licenses as Marital Property: Responses to Some of
O’Brien’s Unanswered Questions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 133, 151 (1987).
133
Arvantides v. Arvantides, 478 N.E.2d 199, 200 (N.Y. 1985).
134
McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
135
Price, 503 N.E.2d at 685.
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ings.136
A.

Calculating Enhanced Earnings

One of the major criticisms to O’Brien is based on the difficulty of placing a value on professional licenses and degrees. 137 To
determine the value, a specific emphasis on the “enhanced earnings”
must be made.138 In O’Brien the court held that:
If the license is marital property, then the working
spouse is entitled to an equitable portion of it, not a return of funds advanced. Its value is the enhanced
earning capacity it affords the holder and although fixing the present value of that enhanced earning capacity
may present problems, the problems are not insurmountable.139
In O’Brien, the value of the enhanced earning potential that is
afforded by the license or degree was established through a simple
calculation.140 The court compared the average income of a college
graduate and that of a person holding such degree or license (in this
case a general surgeon) between the year the plaintiff’s residency
would end and the year that plaintiff reached age sixty-five (signifying age of retirement), while taking into account appropriate adjustments for federal income taxes, inflation rates, interest rates and real
interest rates, thus establishing a “true value.”141 However, this calculation approach is an extreme oversimplification and fails to take
into consideration the many practical factors that contribute to one’s
enhanced earning potential afforded by their degree or license.142
136
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 714; see also Davis, supra note 27, at 895 (“Ordinarily, the
person’s working life is deemed to continue until age sixty-five.”).
137
Willoughby, supra note 132, at 152.
138
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 2010).
139
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 718.
140
Id. at 714.
141
See id.
The court, after considering the life-style that plaintiff would enjoy from
the enhanced earning potential his medical license would bring and defendant's contributions and efforts toward attainment of it, made a distributive award to her of $188,800, representing 40% of the value of the
license, and ordered it paid in 11 annual installments of various amounts
beginning November 1, 1982 and ending November 1, 1992.
Id.
142
Willoughby, supra note 132, at 152.
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There is a high risk of miscalculations and overestimations
when placing a monetary value on degrees and licenses.143 The circumstances of one’s professional career are often unpredictable due
to the many factors that contribute to an individual’s professional
successes or failures.144 A degree or license may authorize a person
to practice in a certain field, but that has no bearing on whether that
person will financially succeed in that field.145 In effect, “a professional degree or license represents nothing other than a possibility of
future earnings.”146 Furthermore, despite obtaining the educational
credentials, many individuals choose not to practice in that field,147 or
sometimes fall victim to circumstances that do not permit them to
work in the field, despite their degree; such as an accident that renders them physically incapable.148 “There is no guarantee” that the
license or degree will actually result in the amount of enhanced earnings that the economists statistically determine.149 Therefore, placing
a value on such an asset is nothing more than speculation.150
Some argue that placing a value on enhanced earning potential, although speculative, is appropriate because:
the complexity of calculating the present value of a
partially exploited professional license is no more difficult than the problem of computing wrongful death
damages or the loss of earning potential that is occasioned by a particular injury. Nor does it lead to significantly more speculation than is involved in the
now-routine task of valuing a professional practice for
the purpose of making a distributive award.151
However, this argument is flawed because it is contradictory to the
objectives of the Equitable Distribution Statute.152 The purpose of
this statute is to divide marital property in a fair manner, not to com143

McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
Lesman v. Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938 (App. Div. 1982); see also Willoughby,
supra note 132, at 152 (“[A] surgeon may work longer hours, experience more pressure, or
accept more responsibility than the average college graduate does in his job.”).
145
Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
146
Greenhaus, supra note 76, at 24 (emphasis added).
147
Davis, supra note 27, at 873.
148
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720 (Meyer, J., concurring).
149
Greenhaus, supra note 76, at 22.
150
Id.
151
McSparron, 662 N.E.2d at 751.
152
Weiss, supra note 124, at 1349.
144
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pensate one spouse for the amount they expected to profit from their
partner during the marriage.153 The current application of the statute
“treats the couple as business partners, with the investing wife anticipating a monetary return.”154 In addition, when two consenting adults
agree to engage themselves in the institution of marriage, they enter
knowing the risks of loss that can occur upon dissolution,155 contrary
to a tort action where the victim does not consent to the loss.156
Another reason why a comparison to a tort case is flawed is
because in a wrongful death claim there can be no way to ascertain
actual earnings of what the individual will make in the future.157
However, in the instance of valuing a professional license or degree
the courts have the burden of guessing future earnings based on prior
and outdated performance.158 Valuing a license or degree is an imprecise task that can have severe consequences, which interfere with
an individual’s personal decisions about their lifestyle.159 This risk is
so severe that the valuation based on enhanced earnings should not be
utilized, especially because there are various alternative approaches
that may be used.160
B.

The Role of Experts in Valuation

The critical factor is not that the holder can practice a particular profession, but rather that there is proof, in the form of expert testimony, that the license has a monetary value because it substantially
enhances “the future earning capacity of the holder.”161 The valuation of a license or degree in court significantly depends on expert
153

Id.
Id. at 1351.
155
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 867.
156
Weiss, supra 124, at 1349.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
See Sophia Hollander, After Divorce, a Degree is Costly, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2012,
at A15, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324481204578180132
637628330.html (statement of Willard DaSilva, Dr. O’Brien’s attorney, comparing the decision to indentured servitude) (“Dr. O’Brien would have to pursue a career in surgery in order
to earn the money to pay for the debt assigned to him by the court, and to force him to do
something he really didn’t want to do . . . .”).
160
Bronstein & Typermass, supra note 67, at 3 (“In O’Brien v. O’Brien, the New York
State Court of Appeals deviated from the vast experience of every other state in the country
when it decided that professional licenses constituted marital property and that such licenses
should be valued and divided between spouses.”).
161
McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
154
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testimony.162 It is clear that judges are given substantial discretion in
regard to expert testimony when establishing the value of a license or
degree.163 Experts generally establish that the value of marital property is based on “the date of the commencement of the matrimonial
action;” however, the trial court has the discretion to change the valuation date to something more appropriate and distribute an award accordingly.164 Furthermore, the trial court is responsible for evaluating
the testimony and giving it the proper weight from the evidence introduced.165
In Esposito-Shea v. Shea,166 the potential earning capacity of
the wife’s law license was ultimately determined by a “battle of the
experts.”167 In this case, both experts sought to determine the wife’s
earning potential with a law degree, as compared to her earning potential without it.168 To this end, they each factored in her work-life
expectancy and reached two separate figures, which were compared
and used to determine her enhanced earning capacity due to her law
degree.169 In order to compute the wife’s earnings without a law degree, her expert used her actual employment history and statistical
data of how much individuals with a Bachelor’s degree earned in her
geographical location during the pertinent time period.170 The husband’s expert used the wife’s “employment history in the period prior
to obtaining her law degree,” which significantly lowered her earning
162

Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 795-96; see also Chew v. Chew, 596 N.Y.S.2d 950,
953 (Sup. Ct. 1992):
The husband failed to adduce any expert proof at trial despite a full opportunity to do so and therefore, has waived any claim to a distributive
award based upon the value of the Master’s Degree. The failure to adduce expert testimony at trial is fatal to a claim for equitable distribution
which was first made in the defendant’s attorney’s post trial brief and
which set forth, for the first time, calculations as to value.
Id.
163
Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
164
Cleary-Farrell, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
165
Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 796; see also Evans, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (“While
plaintiff presented expert testimony that reached a different conclusion, it was for [sic] Supreme Court to evaluate this testimony, assign to it whatever weight the court believed it deserved and arrive at determinations that were supported by the credible evidence introduced
at trial.”).
166
941 N.Y.S.2d 793 (App. Div. 2012).
167
Id. at 795.
168
Id. at 796.
169
Id. at 795.
170
Id. at 796.
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capacity.171 Ultimately, the court rejected the husband’s expert and
reasoned that had the wife not attended law school she would have
pursued employment that required her Bachelor’s degree.172
Most notably, after the court accepted the wife’s expert valuation of her degree, the husband was awarded only ten percent of its
value.173 This “battle of the experts” approach does not seem to promote the goals of divorce law and specifically the Equitable Distribution Statute, which are to produce reasonably consistent results, promote negotiation and settlement to avoid litigation, and to foster
efficiency to lower legal costs.174 In terms of cost effectiveness, the
financial burden of hiring an expert to value a license or degree175 results in a minimal monetary return due to the inadequate awards
granted by judges.176 The lack of guidelines in the statute leads to inequity because more money is often spent trying to place a value on
the license or degree than the actual return awarded for it.177 In addition, “[v]ague rules also tend to favor the litigant with greater resources . . . [who] can afford to ‘wait it out.’ ”178
VI.

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AND JUDGE DISCRETION

Judges have the most discretion in divorce cases, in comparison to “any other field of private law,”179 and this has only expanded
171

Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
Id.
173
Id. at 797 (noting that although “[t]he husband maintains that he is entitled to a greater
degree of the value of the wife's law degree because he was the family's primary wage earner
during the parties’ marriage and arranged his work schedule so that he could care for their
children while the wife attended law school. However, these sacrifices represented ‘overall
contributions to the marriage rather than an additional effort to support [the wife] in obtaining [her] license.’ ”).
174
Garrison, supra note 8, at 727.
175
19 Carmody-Wait 2d § 118:163.
176
See Cleary-Farrell, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 359 (holding that the husband was entitled to a
distributive award of only seven and a half percent of his wife’s dental hygienist license);
see also Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (granting the husband ten percent of the wife’s
law degree); Brough v. Brough, 727 N.Y.S.2d 555, 559 (App. Div. 2001) (granting plaintiff
“ten percent of [] enhanced earnings” from her teaching certificate); Kriftcher v. Kriftcher,
874 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154-55 (App. Div. 2009) (granting the wife ten percent of the enhanced
earnings of her husband’s law degree).
177
19 Carmody-Wait 2d, supra note 175.
178
See Garrison, supra note 8, at 727; see also Litman, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (explaining
there is no set formula, but rather valuation is based on the expert testimony and the trial
court will develop an award based on the facts before it).
179
Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of
172
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within the past two decades.180 The trial court is “granted substantial
discretion [to] determin[e]” what is equitable under any circumstance
in this area.181 In New York, judges are given thirteen factors182 to
consider and a “catch-all clause”183 which are to be used to distribute
property equitably amongst the parties.184
An empirical analysis by Professor Marsha Garrison,185 atDiscretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 411 (1996).
180
Id. at 404 (explaining that in the past two decades there has been a shift to discretionary distribution in titled based property, the adoption of gender-neutral divorce laws, and the
removal of fault based awards in alimony).
181
Farrell, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
182
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d) (McKinney 2010) listing the factors the court
shall consider when equitably distributing property as:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at
the time of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence
and to use or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the
marriage as of the date of dissolution;
(5) the loss of health insurance benefits upon dissolution of the marriage;
(6) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
(7) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution
made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having
title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career
or career potential of the other party;
(8) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
(9) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(10) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or
any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic
desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any
claim or interference by the other party;
(11) the tax consequences to each party;
(12) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse;
(13) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration.
183
Id. (listing the last factor to be considered as “any other factor which the court shall
expressly find to be just and proper.”).
184
Garrison, supra note 179, at 410.
185
See id. at 430.
[a]nalysis of judicial decision making under the Equitable Distribution
Law is part of a larger research project aimed at determining the impact
of the change in legal standards upon divorce outcomes. For analysis of
the statute's overall impact, data were drawn from the court files of approximately 900 divorces filed in 1978, two years before enactment of
the Equitable Distribution Law, and from the files of approximately 900
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tempted to reveal how judges in New York utilize these factors in
their decisions.186 The study concluded that in the first few years following the enactment of the Equitable Distribution Statute, cases determined by a judge, as opposed to settlement agreements, had a
strong tendency to result in distributing most marital assets relatively
equally.187 Nevertheless, when evaluating the particular distribution
of couples who owned a professional degree, husbands were found to
receive “a disproportionate share of the net marital assets” resulting
from the degree.188 It was found that:
[t]o the extent that disproportionate distribution to one
spouse was predictable, it thus tended to reflect monetary contribution to the marriage instead of need. The
husband’s ownership of a large percentage of marital
assets, of a business or professional license, and a
higher value for net marital assets were all associated
with an increased likelihood that the husband would
receive a disproportionate percentage of marital net
worth.189
Thus, the data reflects that despite the Equitable Distribution Statute,
judges often do not award proportional shares to the non-titled
spouse, and when they do, it is usually based on monetary contributions as opposed to the intended factors of the statute, such as one’s
contributions as a parent and homemaker.190 Garrison’s study further
concluded that what was most notable about property division in divorce is that there was no data that reflected a consensus or trend as

divorces filed in 1984, four years after the law's passage. In order to examine regional variation in case outcomes, cases were selected in equal
numbers from three diverse counties: one from New York City, one
from the suburban belt surrounding it, and one representative of the
mixed urban/rural upstate region. Analysis of the case data revealed that
the average property distribution varied little over the research period but
that the frequency and duration of alimony awards declined markedly.
Case outcomes for both time periods were also highly variable; the passage of the law thus appeared to have little effect in improving the consistency of results.
Id.
186
187
188
189
190

Id. at 406-08.
Id. at 452.
Garrison, supra note 179, at 458.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 465.
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to how judges deviated from the new trend of equal division.191
The critics of judicial discretion assume that uniform rules
will suffice in divorce law and that individualized decisions are not
necessary.192 The current shift in divorce law, which is no longer a
fault based system, and the “enhanced role of dependency prevention
as a theme of divorce law” has eliminated the need for individualized
judgments.193 However, equitable distribution of property has somehow increased discretionary decision-making.194 This has been attributed to the emotionally charged competing views of the nation on
marital roles, gender, and individual obligations in a marriage.195
Thus, the legislature has decided not to create a rule-based system.196
VII.

THE INABILITY TO MODIFY A DISTRIBUTIVE AWARD OF A
LICENSE OR DEGREE

New York takes the approach of classifying licenses and degrees as marital property, subject to equitable distribution set by the
standard in O’Brien.197 This approach has various implications on
divorced parties, one of which includes the inability to modify or
amend such awards after the decree is final.198 DRL § 236(B)(9)(b)
states in part that:
[w]here, after the effective date of this part, a separation agreement remains in force no modification of a
prior order or judgment incorporating the terms of said
agreement or order as modified shall supersede the
terms of the prior agreement and judgment for such
period of time and under such circumstances as the
court determines.199
The effect of this section is that unlike a decree of maintenance or
child support, once a distributive award is finalized it “is not subject

191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

Id. at 466.
Id. at 417.
Garrison, supra note 179, at 421.
Id.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 422-23.
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720 (Meyer, J., concurring).
Id.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(9)(b) (McKinney 2010).
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to change.”200 This is best represented in the case of Siegel v.
Siegel.201
In Siegel, during the marriage, the parties acquired “valuable
furniture and artwork.”202 Upon divorce, the furniture and artwork
were appropriately classified as marital property and were distributed
accordingly within the trial court’s judgment.203 A month later, Diego Giacommenti, the artist who designed most of the pieces, died.204
The husband requested a new trial and alleged that based on the
changed circumstances of the artist’s death, the artwork and crafted
furniture had increased in value and therefore, resulted in inequity in
the divorce decree.205 The court denied the motion.206 The Court of
Appeals affirmed and stated that the denial of a new trial was proper
because “even if we assume that certain assets, such as the
Giacommetti artwork, substantially increased in value since the time
of the trial, this would have no effect on the validity of the equitable
distribution of property ordered by the court.”207 The court explained
that if they allowed the husband’s modification of asset judgments,
due to an unforeseen change in value that took place after trial, it
would “undermine the finality of judgment in matrimonial actions.”208 Thus, if a degree or license were subject to such a rule, it
too would not be subject to an equitable modification.209
A professional license or degree is distinct from other property, such as artwork and should not be classified as “marital property
subject to distribution upon divorce.”210 A professional license or
degree far exceeds the traditional aspects of property, including
“transferable value, assignability or inheritability.”211 A degree or license, does not solely represent an enhanced earning capacity, but rather reflects the individual’s hard work, efforts, and personal sacrifices, which the monetary value of the license or degree does not
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211

O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720 (Meyer, J., concurring).
523 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 1987).
Id. at 521.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 522.
Siegel, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Weiss, supra note 124, at 1346.
Id.
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account for.212 Although the Equitable Distribution Statute attempts
to disregard these inherent disparities by stating this is a unique statutory creation,213 it avoids the problems that accompany creating a
new form of property, such as the uncertainty of placing a value on
such property.214
Some supporters of the statute argue “that an education[] degree is [similar] [to] other intangible items of property”, such as pension benefits that have not vested.215 However, this comparison is not
persuasive because pension benefits have a quantifiable dollar
amount, which is certain to vest, unlike professional licenses and degrees in which the monetary value is based on “highly uncertain future events.”216 The court seeks to achieve finality in divorce judgments but this is extremely unjust when one is to place a value on
property that is entirely speculative and cannot be modified despite
changed circumstances.217 The projected future earnings may create
hardships to the licensed spouse if the spouse fails to attain the average earnings of the profession.218 This may be attributable to various
factors such as an economically depressed profession, the inability to
find employment, a physical impairment as a result of an accident or
unforeseen illness, and choosing a certain sub-section within that profession that pays below average salary.219 If the licensed spouse is
simply not making the projected earnings, it will result in unjust inequities and place a severe hardship on them with no available remedy.220
Moreover, the courts do not address the contradictory results
of licenses and degrees being classified as marital property. 221 Marital property is to include any property acquired during the marriage

212

In Re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d at 77.
Davis, supra note 27, at 869.
214
Weiss, supra note 124, at 1347.
215
Id. at 1346.
216
Id. at 1347.
217
Id.; see, e.g., O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720 (Meyer, J., concurring) (suggesting that “if
the assumption as to career choice on which a distributive award payable over a number of
years is based turns out not to be the fact (as, for example, should a general surgery trainee
accidentally lose the use of his hand), it should be possible for the court to revise the distributive award to conform to the fact”).
218
Weiss, supra note 124, at 1347.
219
Willoughby, supra note 132, at 153.
220
Id.
221
Weiss, supra note 124, at 1348.
213
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and therefore subject to equitable distribution.222 However, the assets
resulting from a professional license or degree would be acquired after the marriage, yet these future earnings are still being subject to
equitable distribution.223
The most troubling factor of classifying licenses and degrees
as marital property subject to distributive awards is placing a highly
speculative value on one’s career choice, especially because they
cannot be modified.224 An individual may decide that he or she no
longer wants to practice in a particular field, regardless of his or her
attained degree.225 However, “[b]y not allowing modification, the
legislature prevents some licensed spouses from altering their career
paths before they have even settled in their chosen field of practice.”226 This is an extremely unjust consequence, which imposes a
life choice on the licensed spouse.227
VIII. REJECTING LICENSES AND DEGREES AS MARITAL
PROPERTY AND THE VARIOUS APPROACHES ADOPTED BY
OTHER STATES
Many courts realize that inequity occurs when one spouse has
completed an educational license or degree, while the other spouse
has held back their individual professional goals in an effort to support their spouse.228 Despite this fact, those courts have refused to
classify the degree or license as marital property.229 These courts do
not allow for such classification of degrees and licenses mainly based
on the practical difficulties of placing a monetary value on licenses
and degrees,230 as well as the underlying concern that the award
would be not be subject to modification.231 Due to these concerns,
most states do not classify licenses and degrees as marital property,
222

O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 713.
Weiss, supra note 124, at 1348.
224
Willoughby, supra note 132, at 153.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 149.
229
See, e.g., Drapek v. Drapek, 503 N.E.2d 946, 950 (N.Y. 1987).
230
McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
231
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720; see also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982)
(holding that finality of such a judgment is a major concern based on the fact that placing a
value on a degree or license is speculative, unpredictable, and if a severe inequity arises, the
court will not be able to remedy the situation).
223
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and instead have found other ways to achieve equitable distribution
that allows for modification of judgment orders.232 Two alternative
approaches include: (1) increased alimony or maintenance awards;
and (2) reimbursement alimony.
A.

Increased Alimony or Maintenance Awards

Those states that allow for increased alimony or maintenance
awards provide that when determining the asset amount to grant,
“earning capacity of the degree holder and the contributions of the
nondegree holder may be considered.”233 Most of these states rely on
General Law c. 208 § 34, which:
is clearly broad enough to allow courts to consider the
increased earning potential engendered by a professional degree in determining an award of alimony and
assignment of the estates of the parties. Neither the
degree or license itself, however, nor the increased
earning capacity of the degree holder is an asset subject to assignment.234
The case of Drapek v. Drapek235 conveys the approach and rationale of increased alimony. In Drapek, the husband appealed from
a judgment of divorce that ordered him to pay his wife “annual installments and [a portion] of his gross earnings.”236 The husband
contended that it was an error to classify his medical degree and increased earnings based on that degree as “part of his estate subject to
equitable assignment under G.L. c. 208, § 34.”237 He further argued
that the “alimony awarded was an abuse of discretion.”238 In order to
properly assess whether the trial court erred, this court referred to
General Law c. 208, § 34, which provides for the specifications of al232

Harvey G. Landau, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half Full? 78 N.Y. ST. B.J. 46, 46
(2006) (noting that “New York is the only state to adhere to the view that a non-transferable
advanced degree, license, or certification constitutes marital assets subject to distribution.”).
233
Drapek, 503 N.E.2d at 950. For other examples of states that use this approach, see,
e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 736 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1987); Wisner v. Wisner, 631 P.2d 75 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1981); Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage of
Hortsmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Stevens v. Stevens, 492 N.E.2d 131 (Ohio 1986).
234
Drapek, 503 N.E.2d at 950.
235
503 N.E.2d 946 (N.Y. 1987).
236
Id. at 947.
237
Id. at 947-48.
238
Id. at 948.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss1/13

28

Giannakis: Faking Equity

2014]

FAKING EQUITY

209

imony for either of the parties.239 This statute provides what the trial
judges must240 and may consider when awarding alimony.241 Under
the statute, the court may consider “the contribution of each of the
parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of
their respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a
homemaker to the family unit.”242 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the husband’s medical degree and resulting enhanced
earning capacity could not be considered part of his estate; however,
on remand, the judge may amend the alimony in order to reflect the
value of his degree and enhanced earnings.243 The court rejected the
classification of a professional degree or license as a marital asset
subject to division by emphasizing the speculative nature of assigning
such values and the court’s inability to modify such a judgment; it
therefore reasoned that a judgment of alimony was more appropriate.244
As previously stated, both alimony and maintenance awards
can be paid to a party “for a definite or indefinite period of time, to
meet the reasonable needs of [the] party.”245 The judiciary regards
increased alimony or maintenance awards as “rehabilitative measure[s], available only until the spouse is able to enter the labor
force.”246 This can be quite problematic when applied in circumstances when a spouse has been out of the work force for a long period of time, because it is often difficult and highly unlikely that the
spouse will be able to obtain a career and automatically become selfsupporting.247
B.

Reimbursement Alimony

Some states take another approach and provide for reim239

Id. at 948.
Drapek, 503 N.E.2d at 948; see also G.L c. 208 § 34 (stating that the trial court is required to consider “the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage,
the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for
future acquisition of capital assets and income.”).
241
Drapek, 503 N.E.2d at 948.
242
Id. at 948; see also G.L. c. 208 § 34.
243
Drapek, 503 N.E.2d at 950.
244
Id. at 949.
245
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 871.
246
Id. at 872.
247
Id. at 873.
240
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bursement alimony. Reimbursement alimony is a:
circumstance[] where a supporting spouse should be
reimbursed for the financial contributions he or she
made to the spouse’s successful professional training.
Such reimbursement alimony should cover all financial contributions towards the former spouse’s education, including household expenses, educational costs,
school travel expenses and any other contributions
used by the supported spouse in obtaining his or her
degree or license.248
The theory behind reimbursement alimony is that one spouse sacrificed or postponed his or her own educational goals in order to support the household, and therefore he or she should be compensated
through either a “lump sum or a short-term award to achieve economic self-sufficiency.”249 In Mahoney v. Mahoney,250 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey had to decide whether an M.B.A. degree obtained by a spouse during the course of a marriage should be categorized as property and subject to equitable distribution upon a divorce
proceeding.251 The court rejected the classification of an M.B.A. degree as marital property and did not subject such a degree to equitable
distribution.252 The court reasoned that future earnings are extremely
speculative and the finality of such a distribution was too risky because there was no remedy if a property distribution were to result in
unfairness.253 The court decided, in order to avoid this inherent unfairness related to the classification of a degree as property, to take a
cost approach.254 The cost approach reimburses a spouse by awarding him or her a certain amount, which is calculated by the cost of
supporting the other spouse who obtained the degree.255 New York
law rejects this approach on the basis that it refuses to view a mar248
Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 534. For more examples of states that use this approach see,
e.g., Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Hoak v. Hoak, 370
S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1988).
249
Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 535; see also Landau, supra note 232, at 46 (stating that “New
York is the only state to adhere to the view that a non-transferable advanced degree, license,
or certification constitutes marital assets subject to distribution.”).
250
453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982).
251
Id. at 530.
252
Id. at 536.
253
Id. at 532.
254
Id. at 533.
255
Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 533.
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riage as a “business arrangement in which the parties keep track of
debits[,] credits, [and] their accounts to be settled upon divorce.”256
IX.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

The purpose of the Equitable Distribution Statute is to promote a sense of fairness between spouses upon dissolution of marriage.257 The statute is premised on the belief that marriage is an economic partnership and both parties must be accounted for with
regards to their contributions, whether it is via the workforce or as a
homemaker.258 Despite attempts to achieve equity through the landmark decision of O’Brien, establishing professional licenses as marital property and its later expansion to include educational degrees in
McGowan, the struggle to attain equity still continues, as these cases
have resulted in their own injustices.259 The difficulty of applying the
provisions of the Equitable Distribution Law to property such as licenses and degrees has resulted in inequity, which is inconsistent
with the legislative intent of the statute.260
There has been a consistent trend within the trial courts in the
state of New York granting exceedingly modest awards, which exemplifies the hesitation of granting awards based on the enhanced
earnings of licenses or degrees.261 Some argue that the “statutory
framework for the distribution of marital assets is being intentionally
disregarded by the courts.”262 However, another explanation for such
modest awards may be the lack of guidance with respect to valuating
licenses and degrees provided for in the statutory language.263
Consequently judges remain extremely conservative when
granting these awards to avoid inequity.264 Some may argue that valuing a degree or license is not unlike valuing other indeterminable as256

Id.
Davis, supra note 27, at 870.
258
Id.
259
Ellman, supra note 2, at 981.
260
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 864.
261
See Cleary-Farrell, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 359 (holding that the husband was entitled to a
distributive award of only seven and a half percent of his wife’s dental hygienist license); see
also Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (granting the husband ten percent of the wife’s law
degree); Brough v. Brough, 727 N.Y.S.2d 555, 559 (App. Div. 2001) (granting the plaintiff
only ten percent of the enhanced earnings of the teaching certificate obtained by spouse).
262
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 847.
263
Id. at 864.
264
Ellman, supra note 2, at 981.
257
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sets, including unvested pension benefits265 or loss of earning potential in wrongful death or personal injury claims, because they all require a degree of speculation.266 However, it should at least be recognized by the legislature that license and degrees are in fact a unique
type of property.267 Licenses and degrees do not follow the traditional notions of property because they are highly personal to the owner
in that it reflects their own efforts and abilities and, furthermore, their
value is only attributable to these personal efforts.268 If a new form of
property asset is to be created, the legislature must respect and recognize the need for guidelines in how to value such property.269
The O’Brien decision must be overturned in that it calls for
valuating licenses and degrees based on a party’s enhanced earning
capacity. The Equitable Distribution Statute must be amended270 to
provide better guidance for courts to use in how to place a value on
licenses and degrees and thereafter how to determine a proper award
based on the value of the license or degree.271 The legislature should
implement a formula to use when valuating licenses and degrees,
which will allow for more “simplicity and predictability.”272 Some
may argue that rigid rules and guidelines are unworkable in divorce
law because the sensitive nature of the cases requires individualized
decisions to reflect the unique family circumstances of each case.273
However, the best solution is to provide a formula that can be applied
consistently,274 yet allows for flexibility to ensure that the individualized needs of the spouse’s are met in this sensitive area of law.275
265

Weiss, supra note 124, at 1346.
McSparron, 662 N.E.2d at 751.
267
Davis, supra note 27, at 869.
268
James Mastracchio & Nicholas Mastracchio, Professional License Value in a Divorce,
66 CPA JOURNAL ONLINE 1, 1 (1996), available at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajourn
al/1996/1296/features/professional.htm.
269
Davis, supra note 27, at 869.
270
See Tim Grant, The High Cost of Divorce Breaking Up can be Really Hard to do in a
Tough Economy, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 27, 2012), available at www.postgazette.com/stories/.../the-high-cost-of-divorce-663830/ (showing that the intended goals of
the Equitable Distribution Statute are still relevant as “[d]ivorce [] can be a rude financial
awakening for women whose main job was running the household and caring for the children” because although many of these women have college degrees “they have been out of
work for so long that technology has swept by them. Their skills have become obsolete.”).
271
Garrison, supra note 179, at 521.
272
Garrison, supra note 8, at 731.
273
Garrison, supra note 179, at 405.
274
Id. at 412.
275
Id. at 405 (stating “fairness to the many families affected by divorce law demands
266
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The best formula to be used under the Equitable Distribution
Statute for placing a value on a license or degree and thereafter granting an equitable award based on its value would provide that if a
spouse has significantly contributed to the student spouse’s attainment of the degree or license, then there should be a ten year payout
based on actual earnings. The percentage awarded during this ten
year payout should be based on a sliding scale beginning at ten percent and increasing in ten percent increments based on the amount of
contributions put forth, and leveling off at fifty percent of the titled
spouse’s income as the maximum award. A spouse’s contributions
should only be considered “significant” as to apply to the statute
when the contributing spouse has been with the student spouse for at
least half of the class credits or hours required for the attainment of
the license or degree. If the contributing spouse meets such requirements then there should be a presumption that they be awarded at
least ten percent, with the possibility of increased benefits based on
the specifics of their contributions. The court should utilize the present factors listed in the Equitable Distribution Statue assuming that
the more factors satisfied, the greater the payout percentage. Furthermore, the court should classify “significant contributions” as both
financial contributions and one’s role in being a homemaker or parent.276 The formula would continue to apply if the spouse is remarried because its main purpose is to promote a sense of fairness because even though one spouse may remarry and move forward, the
past sacrifices still remain relevant. The application of this formula
will remedy the two most problematic issues of the statute, which
have resulted in inequity.277
The ten-year timeframe provided in the formula quells three
major concerns that may accompany this formula. These include the
issue of the titled spouse postponing their career, the issue of establishing a career long enough to obtain the average earnings in the profession and the issue of promoting finality in divorce. The ten-year
period is long enough that it is unlikely that most titled spouses will
postpone their careers to avoid payment and allows the titled-spouse
standards that achieve predictable and consistent outcomes”).
276
See Weiss, supra note 124, at 1351 (reflecting that N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 accounts for contributions of both monetary and household).
277
Two most problematic issues of the statute, as suggested by this Comment are: (1) the
difficulty of placing a value on a license and degree and (2) the resistance of the trial courts
to grant adequate awards based on the appraised value of the licenses and degrees, both of
which have resulted in the statute being inequitable.
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attain the average earnings of someone in the profession, yet it is
short enough to promote a sense of finality in divorce.
Moreover, the ten-percent increment adjustment is a good
starting point for distributions because it is small enough that it will
have a modest impact for those who did not significantly contribute
to the attainment, yet the increase is large enough to provide those
who made greater contribution to attain a larger award. A ten-percent
increment is more desirable than a smaller increment because it will
be harder for the court to use arbitrary discretion to award judgments.
For example, if the sliding scale of distributions were only based on
two percent increments it would be difficult to distinguish why a
judge awarded two percent to one litigant, as opposed to an award of
four percent to another litigant.
The idea of equitable distribution was intended to promote a
sense of fairness in the treatment of women upon divorce.278 This
above formula still accounts for spousal contributions as well as financial contributions and it recognizes the efforts of being a parent or
a homemaker, which satisfy the historical intent of the enactment of
this law.279 As seen throughout this Comment, the current methods
of valuation resulted in a bias towards women, rather than benefiting
them.280 The provided method will force a more consistent approach,
which will ultimately result in achieving greater awards for women.
This formula also will remedy the current issues of timing and
contributions involved in distributing an award281 because of its clear
rules. If the contributing spouse was married to the titled spouse for
at least half of the credits or hours required for the license or degree
attainment then it is deemed that their contributions are substantial.
This portion of the formula ultimately merges the accrual of marital
property and the substantial contribution factors to give more direct
guidance to the courts. If the Kyle decision282 were to be analyzed
under this approach, the court would find that because the contributing spouse was married to the student spouse for more than half of
the attainment of the credits required for the principal’s license then it
278
Ellman, supra note 2, at 981 (replacing the previous title theory approach, which
granted property to the person who held title in their name, usually men).
279
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 715.
280
Garrison, supra note 179, at 414-15.
281
Greenhaus, supra note 76, at 23.
282
See Kyle, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (exemplifying the circumstances when a court deemed
that a principal’s license was not deemed marital property subject to equitable distribution
because the titled spouse still required two courses to complete it).
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would be said that she has substantially contributed to its attainment.
Thereafter the contributing spouse would have obtained at least tenpercent of actual earnings from the titled spouse for ten years, unless
the titled spouse283 can overcome this presumption.
The next issue that this formula will remedy is the inability to
accurately calculate the enhanced earning potential that is afforded to
the titled spouse based on the attainment of the degree or license.284
Placing a value on enhanced earnings is entirely too speculative,285
especially because the earning potential can drastically vary based on
the individual’s career goals and economic job market of the field,
which the titled spouse has no control over.286 The formula presented
allows for a reasonable solution that will provide for greater equity
amongst both spouses. The formula suggests that there should be a
ten-year payout based on actual earnings. This allows for the nontitled spouse to regain some of the fruits of its attainment and to
compensate them for his or her efforts, without placing a heavy burden on the titled spouse to provide earnings that he or she may not actually be obtaining, or forcing them to stay in a field that they may
not want to remain in. This distinct rule takes away the uncertainty
and speculation that is irrationally applied to property as unique as
licenses and degrees, which ultimately will lead to greater equity.
The suggested formula also alleviates the problem of the high
emphasis placed on experts.287 The use of experts will not be necessary to predict enhanced earnings, but rather earnings are determined
from actual payment records during the ten-year period. However,
experts might be used to demonstrate the percentage of actual earnings that the non-titled spouse should be entitled to. This will not be
as significant of an issue because of the presumed ten percent that
will be given to the contributing spouse. The less reliance on experts
will likely lead to a fairer playing field and result in more equitable
results.288
The issue of avoiding duplicative awards289 will also be re283
See Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 796 (stating that the current approach requires the
burden to be on the non-titled spouse to demonstrate that they made a substantial contribution to its attainment).
284
Willoughby, supra note 132, at 152.
285
Greenhaus, supra note 76, at 22.
286
Willoughby, supra note 132, at 153.
287
Esposito-Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 795-97.
288
Garrison, supra note 8, at 727.
289
Grunfeld v. Grunfeld, 688 N.Y.S.2d 77, 80 (App. Div. 1999).
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solved based on this formula. The non-titled spouse will receive a
portion of the actual earnings, meaning that if the license or degree
develops into a practice then the non-titled spouse is entitled to a portion of it. There will be no need to distinguish between the amounts
received for future earning potential and the amount received from an
established practice. If a practice is in existence then the actual earnings will be determined based on the income it produces.
Judicial discretion has long accompanied the matrimonial
field and it is not likely to be completely eliminated.290 However, the
particular data involving awards of licenses and degrees reflects that
non-titled spouses are frequently awarded disparate monetary awards,
contrary to the intent of the statute.291 One possible explanation why
judges have so sparingly and modestly applied this statute may be attributable to the lack of guidelines. A heavy burden is placed on the
judge to attain equity without firm guidelines. Furthermore, the reminder that the award will be final and not subject to modification
further exacerbates this burden. Amending the statute to provide a
proper valuation formula for licenses and degrees will result in judges
more consistently applying the law in a way that promotes equity.292
The inability to modify the award, which is a paramount issue
in placing a value on licenses and degrees and subjecting them to distributive awards,293 will not be as problematic because the guidelines
set forth in the formula allow for the award to balance itself to create
equity. For example, the concurring opinion by Justice Meyer in
O’Brien expresses the concern over inequity that may result if a surgeon lost their hand after an award was granted based on his enhanced earnings as a working surgeon.294 If the situation arose that a
surgeon lost his hand and no longer worked as a surgeon or could obtain a comparable salary, the proposed formula would afford an equitable solution because the payout would reflect his actual earnings
therefore relieving him of the obligation to pay an amount that he can
not afford.
As seen, other states have chosen to reject licenses and degrees as marital property and compensate non-titled spouses by other

290
291
292
293
294

Garrison, supra note 179, at 404.
Kaufman, supra note 4, at 864.
Garrison, supra note 8, at 727.
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720 (Meyer, J., concurring).
Id.
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means;295 however, New York has held true to its precedent as set
forth in O’Brien.296 If New York wants to continue to abide by this
precedent there must be a change in the statute that will recognize the
problems of classifying licenses and degrees as marital property and
it must make proper changes to provide for equity.
X.

CONCLUSION

The Equitable Distribution Statute should be seen as a great
accomplishment in terms of attempting to promote a progressive legislation, which seeks to level the playing field by treating both spouses as equals in marriage. The statute had hopeful intentions to provide protection to those underrepresented in the past and attempted to
balance the inequalities that have once plagued our legal system. The
O’Brien decision further attempted to validate the intentions of the
statute by classifying licenses and degrees as marital property subject
to equitable distribution. However, the facts of the O’Brien case
were clearly sympathetic and there was an obvious need to remedy
the wife in these unjust circumstances. Therefore the court held that
the degree should be marital property subject to equitable distribution. However, the continued precedent of this case, of classifying
licenses and degrees as marital property, has proven inequitable.
The difficulty of placing a value on the degree or license and
the trial courts moderate awards based on its valuation, does not in
fact result in just outcomes. If New York wants to continue the precedent of the O’Brien decision a change to the Equitable Distribution
Statute is essential. The Statute must be amended to create more
specified guidelines of how to value licenses and degrees and what
percentages they should be awarded because overbroad legislation often results in inequity due to the inability to create consistent and
predictable results. Some legal fields such as divorce law are far too
individualized to provide for standard uniform rules that would be
appropriately applied to all. However it is important to provide some
uniform guidelines to ensure that the statute will properly be applied
and result in its anticipated purposes, an equitable remedy.
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See, e.g., Drapek, 503 N.E.2d at 950.
See Landau, supra note 248, at 46.
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